Submitted by Cedric Hughes on Mon, 04/14/2008 - 11:31
About 14 km west of Chase, BC Highway 1 curves. A double solid centre line marks the lanes. There, on July 23, 2003, on a sunny hot afternoon at about 2pm, a driver (we’ll refer to as Mr. Beatty), while driving the speed limit, failed to take the curve, crossed the line and crashed into an oncoming car killing its three occupants.
The road was in good repair, bare and dry. Subsequent inspections showed no mechanical problems with Mr. Beatty’s vehicle, that he was not impaired by intoxicants, indeed, that up until the crash he was driving “in a proper manner.”
Witnesses also indicated that neither vehicle swerved to avoid the crash. Reportedly, Mr. Beatty “appeared dazed and uncomprehending when asked what had happened.” He told the police that he was driving and “went unconscious”. He said he had been working in the sun all day. He told an ambulance attendant, “I just lost consciousness. I think it was heat stroke”.
Mr. Beatty was charged with three counts of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing death under s. 249(4) of the Criminal Code. The offence is defined as operating “a motor vehicle in a manner that is dangerous to the public, having regard to all the circumstances…” The trial judge acquitted Mr. Beatty. The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial. The Supreme Court of Canada restored the acquittals, a ruling widely reported in the media.
Google: R. v. Beatty SCC to read the decision online. The Court discusses the difference between criminal and civil negligence. In a criminal charge, the Crown Counsel (prosecutor) generally has to show some form of intent – the driver meant to do it or was reckless to a point where obvious consequences of the driving were intentionally disregarded.
The Supreme Court of Canada held that “viewed from an objective basis, this momentary act of negligence was insufficient evidence to support a finding of a “marked departure” from the standard of care of a prudent driver.” Result: no intent.
The decision offers the following insights on the particular challenge of proving criminal intent in driving cases:
“Because driving, in large part, is automatic and reflexive, some departures from the standard expected of a reasonably prudent person will inevitably be the product, …of ‘little conscious thought’. Even the most able and prudent driver will from time to time suffer from momentary lapses of attention. These lapses may well result in conduct that, when viewed objectively, falls below the standard expected of a reasonably prudent driver…The fact that the danger may be the product of little conscious thought becomes of concern because … ‘The law does not lightly brand a person as a criminal.’…driving, although inherently risky, is a legal activity that has social value.”
The key to understanding (or at least, accepting) this decision is the finding, mentioned above, that up until the time of the crash Mr. Beatty had been driving “in a proper manner”.

















